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BUSTED PIPES: A REVIEW OF TARRANT REGIONAL
WATER DISTRICT V. HERRMANN AND THE LACK OF
DIRECTION FOR OKLAHOMA AND TEXAS MOVING
FORWARD IN A DRY ENVIRONMENT
Jordan LePage *
When it is a mere question of whether provisional confidence
can be placed in a certain class of statements, there cannot
profitably and sensibly be one rule for the business world and
another for the court-room. The merchant and the manufacturer
must not be turned away remediless because methods in which
the entire community places a just confidence are a little difficult
to reconcile with technical judicial scruples on the part of the
same persons who as attorneys have already employed and
relied upon the same methods. In short, Courts must here cease
to be pedantic and endeavor to be practical.1
I. Introduction
Oklahoma and Texas have had their disagreements, to say the least, over
the Red River and its abundant water resources. For example, in July of
1931, a dispute concerning a free bridge constructed near a toll bridge
connecting Durant, Oklahoma, and Denison, Texas, caused Oklahoma
governor “Alfalfa Bill” Murray to declare martial law and call upon the
National Guard to enforce his executive order opening the public bridge. 2
Texas responded with a detachment of Texas Rangers tasked with
maintaining the barricades until the Texas-court injunction against the free
bridge was dismissed. 3 This “near miss” reportedly prompted Adolf Hitler
to believe the United States was not so united after all during the events

* Second-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 129 (1930) (quoting 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A
TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §
1530, at 278 (1923), taken out of context solely for it analogous relationship to the current
actions of the judiciary with respect to water preservation.)
2. Lonn W. Taylor, Red River Bridge Controversy, TEXAS STATE HIST. ASS’N (Dec.
18, 2013), http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/mgr02.
3. The Strains of Depression and War, OKLA. DEP’T OF TRANSP. (Dec. 18, 2013),
http://www.okladot.state.ok.us/hqdiv/p-r-div/spansoftime/strains.htm.
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leading up to the Second World War.4 However, even in the course of such
seemingly-serious scenarios neither state has applied for foreign aid. Until
now.
Nearly eighty years later, but less than seventy miles downstream from
the Durant-Denison Bridge, Texas and Oklahoma appeal to the courts
again. However, this time Texans want to cross the Red River to take
something back: water. In the same Reach and Subbasin 5 that spawned the
bridge controversy a Texas state agency asserted its right to appropriate
water from a source located entirely within Oklahoma, the Kiamichi River. 6
In the face of rapidly growing demand, and a rigid Oklahoma public policy
disfavoring out-of-state applicants for water resources, Texas state agencies
in charge of providing water to millions of Texans turned first to the tribal
nations within Oklahoma for support. These tribal nations—notably the
Apache Tribe of Oklahoma, the Chickasaw Tribe of Oklahoma, and the
Choctaw Tribe of Oklahoma, and the Comanche and Kiowa Tribes of
Oklahoma—hold reserved water rights, which, once quantified, could hold
the keys to both the north Texas water shortage and immediate economic
development for the tribes. However, these rights have not yet been
quantified, and as such, hold only speculative value for the water districts
facing ever-growing demand.
Tarrant Regional Water District (“TRWD”) is a Texas governmental
agency responsible for providing water to more than 1.6 million people in
north-central Texas, including Fort Worth, Arlington, and Mansfield.7

4. Id.
5. “Reach” and “Subbasin” are generic terms for non-uniform measurements of rivers
and waterways, herein, they are used as specifically defined by the Red River Compact. See
82 OKLA. STAT. § 1431 (2013). Tarrant concerns a section of the Kiamichi River south of
Hugo Lake located in Reach II, defined as “the Red River from Denison Dam to the point
where it crosses the Arkansas-Louisiana state boundary and all tributaries, which contribute
to the flow of the River within this reach.” Id. § 1431, at 1847 (section 2.12(b) of the
Compact); see id. § 1431, at 1850 (section 5.05(a)-(d) of the Compact, defining Subbasin 5).
6. In 2007 Tarrant Regional Water District filed three applications for appropriation,
two in Reach I, Subbasin 2—at Cache Creek and Beaver Creek—an area under the Red
River Compact allocated solely to the State of Oklahoma; the third at the Kiamichi River in
Reach II, Subbasin 5, an area under the Compact allocated to each signatory state equally.
By the Supreme Court hearing in 2013 only the Kiamichi River application was under
review and discussion, thus, for the purposes of this Note it will be referred to as the specific
point in controversy. [NOTE TO AUTHOR: DO YOU MEAN “BY THE TIME” OF THE
SUPREME COURT HEARING, OR SOMETHING ELSE?]
7. See Amended Complaint at 1, Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, No. CIV-070045-HE, 2009 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 51994 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 18, 2009); see also
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Following a well-documented shortage of water in northern Texas coupled
with substantial population growth, TRWD conducted studies, which
revealed that its population base is expected to double by 2060. 8 Moreover,
this population increase would cause the area to face a water deficit of
400,000 acre-feet per year. 9 Starting in late 2000, TRWD attempted to
negotiate with the state of Oklahoma and with tribal nations within the state
of Oklahoma to purchase and divert water. 10 Initially, TRWD joined other
Texas water districts and municipalities to form the North Texas Water
Alliance, which sought to negotiate a water-purchase contract with the State
of Oklahoma and the Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations.11 TRWD later
entered into written agreements with the Apache Tribe of Oklahoma—
including a memorandum of understanding—indicating that the two entities
would work cooperatively to quantify the Apache Tribe’s reserved water
rights and develop terms for the purchase or lease of such water. 12 Despite
these efforts, the coalition was unable to effectuate any water export plan
from its neighbor to the north and TRWD commenced legal action.
This note first reviews the several steps along TRWD’s path to the
Supreme Court, paying special attention to the arguments of the water
district as an agent of Texas and the Oklahoma Water Resources Board
(OWRB) as a regulatory office of Oklahoma. After summarizing the
holdings of the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma and the
affirmations on appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, this note
briefly describes two historic cases that heavily influenced the Supreme
Court and dissects the Tenth Circuit ruling that came immediately after
Tarrant on the same facts. This note attempts to show the balance between
a majority view and a lone dissenter, whose opinion foreshadows the
possibility of an actual resolution to the case in question Returning to
Tarrant Regional Water District, this note will describe and critically
analyze the decision of the Supreme Court. Recognizing the distinction
between what was intended, what was argued, and what has previously

Overview, TARRANT REGIONAL WATER DISTRICT (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.trwd.com/
AboutUs.
8. Amended Complaint, supra note 7, at 6.
9. Id. at 7.
10. Brief for the Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 31, Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120 (2013) (No. 11889).
11. Id.
12. Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann (Tarrant IV), NO. CIV-07-0045-HE, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72442, *3-4, *9-11 (W.D. Okla., July 16, 2010).
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been decided, this note will then delve further into the cases, which shaped
the dispositive precedent. In conclusion, this note will attempt to reconcile
the positive aspects of the decisions to date with the future implications for
the Native American Tribes of Oklahoma, the signatory states to the Red
River Compact, and the drought-stricken northern Texas districts.
II. Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann
After roughly three years of unsuccessful negotiations to purchase water
from parties within Oklahoma, TRWD sued in conjunction with its
applications for water-appropriation to the OWRB. While the exact
geography is outside the scope of this paper, the complaint alleged that
TRWD had completed a hydrology study and determined the water
diversion points in question were the most feasible option available;
specifically because once the water flowed into the Red River it became
uneconomical to treat because of its high salinity. 13
The lawsuit, brought in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma, sought to challenge Oklahoma state laws and prevent
the applications from being dismissed pursuant to those laws, and the
priority those applications secured, from being lost.14 Tarrant argued that
the Oklahoma laws regulating water sales and appropriations, which it
called the “Anti-Export Laws,” violated the rights of Texas agencies to
appropriate under the Red River Compact and unconstitutionally impeded
interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause.15
The defendants, represented by the Oklahoma Attorney General’s Office,
were the nine members of the OWRB, named individually only in their
official capacities as board members of both the Oklahoma Water
Resources Board and, ex officio, the Oklahoma Water Conservation Storage
Commission (“OWCSC”). 16 These members were: (1) Rudolf John
Herrmann; (2) Jess Mark Nichols; (3) Bill Secrest; (4) Ford Drummond; (5)
Lonnie Farmer; (6) Ed Fite; (7) Jack W. Keeley; (8) Kenneth K. Knowles;
and (9) Richard Sevenoaks. 17 The board generally meets the third Tuesday
of each month and its primary duties include: “water use appropriation and
13. Amended Complaint, supra note 7, at 7-8.
14. Id. at 24-25.
15. Id. at 15.
16. Id. at 2-3 (citing 82 OKLA. STAT. § 1085.1 (Supp. 2006); 82 OKLA. STAT. § 1085.18
(2001)).
17. Currently only Herrmann, Drummond, Fite, and Sevenoaks remain members of the
OWRB. See The Board, OKLA. WATER RESOURCE BOARD, http://www.owrb.ok.gov/about/
management/board.php (last visited Dec. 10, 2013).
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permitting, water quality monitoring and standards, financial assistance for
water/wastewater systems, dam safety, floodplain management, water
supply planning, technical studies and research, and water resource
mapping.” 18
The statutes being challenged included a 2002 moratorium 19 on the
export by any means of surface or ground water out of state (which expired
according to its terms during the course of the case in 2009); 20 a time-based
rule requiring appropriations exceeding seven years to “promote the
optimal beneficial use of water ‘in Oklahoma;’” 21 and two laws requiring
an authorizing act of the Oklahoma Legislature for any contract, sale, or
exportation of water by the OWRB or an outside water district.22 Tarrant
argued these laws are part of a pervasive public policy, including an
Attorney General Opinion from 1978, 23 to embargo water within
Oklahoma. 24
18. About, OKLA. WATER RESOURCES BOARD, http://www.owrb.ok.gov/about/index.php
(last visited on Jan. 10, 2014).
19. Amended Complaint, supra note 7, at 11 (citing 82 OKLA. STAT. § 1B (Supp. 2006),
and 74 OKLA. STAT. § 1221.A (Supp. 2006)).
20. In response to a dispute regarding whether the moratorium expired as per its term of
years or rather its stated goal in funding a hydrology study, Judge Heaton of the D.W.D.
Okla. humorously noted in note 2 of the July 16, 2010 order granting the Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss that “Defendants’ position as to the moratorium has not always been a
model of consistency.” Tarrant IV, No. CIV-07-0045-HE, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72442, at
*4 n.2 (W.D. Okla. July 16, 2010).
21. Amended Complaint, supra note 7, at 13 (citing 82 OKLA. STAT. § 105.16(B)
(2001)).
22. Id. at 13-14; see also 82 OKLA. STAT. § 1085.2(2) (Supp. 2006); 82 OKLA. STAT. §
1324.10(B) (2001).
23. Oklahoma Attorney General Opinion No. 77-274 (Feb. 28, 1978) (available online
via the Oklahoma Legal Research System) (“Considering these factors together, we consider
the proposition unrealistic that an out-of-state user is a proper permit applicant before the
Oklahoma Water Resources Board. We can find no intention to create the possibility that
such a valuable resource as water may become bound, without compensation, to use by an
out-of-state user.”).
24. See Amended Complaint, supra note 7, at 10. The Complaint alleged:
Oklahoma's public policy is similarly reflected in 1977 Okla. Session Laws
1005, S.J. Res. No. 7, declaring - contrary to governing constitutional doctrine that Oklahoma possessed ‘legal title’ to unappropriated water which would
otherwise flow out of the state (i.e., “it is possible that by continuing to allow
water to flow out of state, Oklahoma's legal title to such water might become
questionable”), and that Oklahoma asserted a “prior right for the State of
Oklahoma” over “the unused and uncontrolled water flowing from the state” in
a quantity about four times the amount which it has even currently appropriated
to beneficial uses, or such other amount that Oklahoma might determine it
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A. Procedural History
In 2007, TRWD filed three water-appropriation permits with the
Oklahoma Water Resources Board (“OWRB”) concurrently with an action
in United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma,
seeking declaratory judgment enjoining the OWRB from enforcing certain
Oklahoma statutes referred to as “Anti-Export Laws.” 25 The basic assertion
was that the Red River Compact (“the Compact”)—an agreement between
Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas—and the Commerce Clause 26
precluded Oklahoma from enforcing state laws, which effectively denied
out-of-state applications for water appropriation. 27 The rationale was that
each state had been allotted 25% of the “excess” flow in Reach 2, Subbasin
5 28 and to deny TRWD’s applications pursuant to the “anti-export laws”
would be inherent protectionism adverse to interstate commerce. 29
In the first instance, TRWD won a slight, but technical, victory when the
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma denied the defendant
OWRB’s Motion to Dismiss in 2007. 30 However, this decision held little
value as to the merits and on appeal the Tenth Circuit only affirmed that the
OWRB was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and dismissed
the argument on abstention, effectively leaving the case itself untouched. 31
Before the second hearing in district court the Oklahoma Legislature
amended one of the challenged statues regarding out-of-state water
applications. 32 On second hearing, the defendant attempted to argue that
this revision impliedly repealed the challenged aspects of the laws and

needed to develop a “comprehensive water plan” under OWRB's auspices.
Id. at 10-11.
25. Id. at 8.
26. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
27. Amended Complaint, supra note 7, at 9.
28. 82 OKLA. STAT. § 1431 (2011) (section 5.05(b)(1) of the Compact).
29. See Amended Complaint, supra note 7, at 15.
30. Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann (Tarrant I), No. CIV-07-0045-HE, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79973 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 29, 2007), rev’d sub nom. Tarrant Reg’l Water
Dist. v. Sevenoaks, 545 F.3d 906 (10th Cir. 2008).
31. Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Sevenoaks (Tarrant II), 545 F.3d 906, 909 (10th Cir.
2008).
32. Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann (Tarrant III), No. CIV-07-0045-HE, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107520, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 18, 2009); see 82 OKLA. STAT. §
105.12(A)(5) (2011) (one of the amended subsections of the statute, directing the OWRB to
determine if the water identified by the out-of-state application could be used elsewhere in
Oklahoma to alleviate in-state water shortages).
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made the plaintiff’s position moot; however, the district court was not
persuaded. 33
However, the district court did grant the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment as to TRWD’s Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause
claims. 34 The court’s rationale was that Congressional approval of the
Compact “constitutes an adoption of standards that preclude a successful
Commerce Clause claim” relating to water subject to the Compact “the
essential nature of which is to allocate and divide resources [between the
signatory states].” 35 Moreover, the court concluded that the Compact’s
language specifically allows consistent state legislation, thereby negating
the Supremacy Clause argument, and the plaintiff’s willingness to negotiate
for water not subject to the compact is “too speculative and uncertain to be
ripe for resolution.” 36 Although, the court did note that nothing in its order
addressed the possibility of a signatory state, such as Texas, from suing for
a compact violation or from precluding Oklahoma negotiating with Texas
as a good neighbor 37, the plaintiff took advantage of the court’s leave to file
an amended complaint and the case was heard yet again in 2010. 38
Two separate claims were included in TRWD’s amended complaint; the
first involved a ten-year option to purchase ground-water from private
owners in Stephens County, Oklahoma, the second concerned a
memorandum of understanding entered into between the plaintiff and the
Apache Tribe of Oklahoma. 39 The first claim was dismissed for a lack of
standing; the court reasoned that more than the mere possibility of future
injury was necessary for a justiciable claim and that nothing on the face of
the challenged statutes, as amended to contemplate out-of-state applicants,
expressly barred the sale. 40 As to the second claim, the court again relied on
the “speculative” nature of the Apache Tribe’s reserved water rights and
possible dealings with the plaintiff to conclude the claim was not ripe for
resolution. 41 After failing to convince the court of the likelihood of
unconstitutional use of the Oklahoma water statutes with regard to water

33. Tarrant III, NO. CIV-07-0045-HE, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107520, at *3, *10.
34. Id. at *31.
35. Id. at *26.
36. Id. at *27-28.
37. Id. at *30.
38. See generally Tarrant IV, NO. CIV-07-0045-HE, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72442
(W.D. Okla., July 16, 2010).
39. Id. at *3-4.
40. Id. at *7.
41. Id. at *11.
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under the Compact, TRWD appealed to the Tenth Circuit in what would
lead to the longest decision of the case.
On appeal, the circuit court affirmed each of the lower court’s holdings
and resoundingly ruled against TRWD. 42 In reviewing the Commerce
Clause claim, the circuit court spoke even more clearly than the court below
in asserting that the Oklahoma statutes were consistent with the Compact.
The court also found that the Compact embodies congressional consent for
state regulation beyond the scope of the interstate agreement itself.43
Moreover, the circuit court interpreted the Compact’s repeated and
consistent use of the term “unrestricted use” as a basis for deference to state
authority over compacted waters within its boundaries; thus this finally did
away with any further argument regarding those two permits filed in the
area wholly allocated to Oklahoma. 44 The court spent a significant amount
of time justifying its interpretation of the Compact section 5.05 relating to
Reach II, Subbasin 5 (an image of which is attached at the end of this Note,
this area essentially surrounds the Red River on either side from the New
Mexico border to the Arkansas-Louisiana border) in terms of both
Commerce Clause and preemption. 45 Ultimately, the court concluded that
the Compact was specifically drafted so that each state would have
complete control of the waters within its borders so long as the section’s
ultimate purpose of ensuring downstream flow. The court quickly dealt
with the issues of standing and ripeness and affirmed the lower court’s
ruling, because neither TRWD, nor the Stephen’s County private owners,
nor the Apache Tribe of Oklahoma had filed for permits with the defendant
board; therefore, no justiciable controversy exists.46 This repeated technical
procedure highlights a flaw in TRWD’s approach to invalidating the “antiexport laws” that will be discussed later in this Note.
The most persuasive passage, in the circuit court’s opinion, relates to the
issue of boundary protection as an extension of state sovereignty; which
became the controlling focus of the court in the final two decisions. “[T]he
better reading of the Compact is that it does not obligate Oklahoma to allow
Texas entities to appropriate Texas’s share of the § 5.05(b)(1) water from
within Oklahoma’s boundaries.” 47 By adopting this vantage point, the
42.
2011).
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann (Tarrant V), 656 F.3d 1222, 1250 (10th Cir.
Id. at 1239.
Id. at 1238.
See id. at 1243-47.
Id. at 1248-50.
Id. at 1246.
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argument ceases to be that Oklahoma is adopting the entitlement bias to
enact protectionist statutes, whose “burden imposed on [interstate]
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits”48
and instead, becomes couched in preserving a state’s authority to close its
borders against the forcible removal of its natural resources. Holding the
opposite, the court pointedly referred back to the initial complaint in which
TRWD alleged “the Compact allocates to Texas the right to take water
from certain stream segments in Oklahoma.” 49 Following the decision of
the circuit court and an invitation by the Supreme Court for an amicus brief
from the Solicitor General, 50 TRWD was granted certiorari to the Supreme
Court. 51 On June 13, 2013, Justice Sotomayor handed down the unanimous
opinion of the Court 52, which amounted to little more than a restatement
and an affirmation of the holding below, as well as a testament to the
ideology above.
B. What Could Have Been
Prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling, the Tarrant case had all the
makings of a landmark decision in water law. The premise calls to mind
Altus v. Carr, the 1966 case in which the United States District Court for
the Western District of Texas invalidated on Commerce Clause grounds a
Texas statute purporting to require legislative approval for the export of
Texas groundwater. 53 Tarrant provided a nearly perfect vehicle to retool
the arguably outdated decision in Sporhase v. Nebraska, which in 1982
declared ground water an article of commerce and invalidated the
reciprocity provision of Nebraska statute controlling water use permitting
and regulation. 54 Both cases are easily distinguished on two grounds: first,
Carr and Sporhase dealt with ground water 55and second, both cases
involved individual owners with property rights on both sides of the state
lines. More importantly, however, Tarrant involves water apportioned
48. Id. at 1233 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
49. Id. at 1247 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1247 n.3 (“[W]e hold that § 5.05(b)(1)
does not allocate water located in Oklahoma to Texas regardless of what amount of water
Tarrant and other Texas users can appropriate in Texas.” (emphasis added)).
50. Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 132 S. Ct. 1878 (2012).
51. Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013).
52. Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann (Tarrant VI or Tarrant), 133 S. Ct. 2120
(2013).
53. Altus v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828, 840 (D.W.D. Tex.), aff’d, 385 U.S. 35 (1966).
54. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 954 (1982).
55. See Tarrant I, NO. CIV-07-0045-HE, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79973, at *16 n.7
(W.D. Okla. Oct. 29, 2007).
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under a compact; whereas Carr and Sporhase did not—a fact the district
court quickly distinguished. 56 This distinction is especially important
because as the court noted, interstate water compacts approved by Congress
become effectively federal statutes and as such may bestow congressional
approval upon otherwise impermissible state statutes.57
However, the writing was on the wall for the judiciary to defer from
directly addressing the state statutes at issue in Tarrant. This case is
substantially similar to the 2011 nonstarter City of Hugo v. Nichols, in
which the Oklahoma municipality of Hugo and the Texas municipality of
Irving entered into a contract to export Oklahoma water to Texas.58 The city
of Hugo already held two permits to appropriate water from the Kiamichi
River south of Hugo Lake (the same location targeted by TWRD) and was
seeking a third permit and modification of the existing two to include
Irving, Texas, as a “place of use.” 59 Fearing Oklahoma statutes would cause
the OWRB to deny Hugo’s appropriation permit application, but before the
Board had acted on its application, the two cities jointly filed suit against
the OWRB seeking to invalidate the statutes on Commerce Clause
grounds. 60 As pointed out by Nicholas Andrew in a Note for the Texas
Environmental Law Journal, it is clear that Hugo and Irving “missed out on
a clear opportunity to differentiate their suit from Tarrant.” 61 However,
much like in the present case, the constitutional issue was overlooked in
favor of narrow readings of procedural requirements.
The city of Hugo was dismissed at the Tenth Circuit for a lack of
standing under a heatedly dissented reading of Branson, 62 barring federal
court jurisdiction over certain controversies between political subdivisions
and their parent state. The majority asserted that under its decision in
Branson, a political subdivision has standing only to “enforce the federal
statutory right, guaranteed by the operation of the Supremacy Clause in the
face of conflicting state law.” 63 In the alternative, the majority stated that it
could find no precedent for a subdivision to sue its parent state under a

56. See Tarrant III, NO. CIV-07-0045-HE, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107520, *18-19
(W.D. Okla. Nov. 18, 2009).
57. Id. at 15 (citing Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987)).
58. City of Hugo v. Nichols, 656 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 2011).
59. Id. at 1254.
60. Id.
61. Nicholas Andrew, Note, Interstate Water Transfers and the Red River Shootout, 41
TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 181, 202 (2011).
62. Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619 (10th Cir. 1998).
63. Hugo, 656 F.3d at 1257 (citing Branson, 161 F.3d at 630).
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substantive provision of the Constitution, such as the dormant Commerce
Clause. 64 However, the dissent read Branson to grant standing to political
subdivisions when bringing a structural constitutional claim and being
sufficiently independent from the parent state. 65 Therefore, the dissent
asserts that Hugo is alleging a structural claim, as opposed to an individual
right claim, under the dormant Commerce Clause and that the court should
continue the modern trend of interpreting the prohibitive political
subdivision precedent more narrowly. 66 In fact, the dissent references
Sporhase, supra, as illustrative of the connection between preemption and
Commerce Clause claims in cases determining congressional consent to
state statutes under the scope of federal law. 67
Subsequent to this analysis, the out-of-state political subdivision Irving
was held to lack standing because the ultimate solution to its cause of action
rested on third party action, not the final judgment of the court; thus, failing
to meet the redressability requirement.68 The majority found that,
distinguishable from Altus v. Carr, supra, because Irving’s standing was
conditioned on its contract with Hugo, which has no right or power to
command a specific decision on its permits from the OWRB, Irving’s claim
was not justiciable. 69 However, this too was argued in the alternative by the
dissent, which asserted that Wyoming Sawmills, in which a timber company
alleged that the Forest Service violated the Establishment Clause by
expanding a protected area and thus depriving the company of access to the
timber on the lands, was decided against the plaintiff because the relief
sought was “too speculative and remote even if the timber company
prevailed on its Establishment Clause claims against the Forest Service.” 70
This rationale recalls a similar finding regarding TRWD’s memorandum of
understanding with the Apache Tribe of Oklahoma. 71 In opposition to the
majority’s holding, the dissent found that a successful dormant Commerce
Clause challenge would redress Irving’s alleged injury by removing “a
major state statutory obstacle” inhibiting its ability to contract.72 This
64. Id. (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 1265 (Matheson, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 1266 (Matheson, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 1273 (Matheson, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 1263-65.
69. Id. at 1264-65.
70. Id. at 1276 (Matheson, J., dissenting) (citing Wyo. Sawmills, Inc. v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 383 F. 3d 1241, 1247 (10th Cir. 2004)).
71. Tarrant IV, NO. CIV-07-0045-HE, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72442, at *11 (W.D.
Okla., July 16, 2010).
72. Hugo, 656 F.3d at 1276 (Matheson, J., dissenting).
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dissent would prove to be a faint and fleeting glimmer of hope for the
north-central Texas water districts as the Tarrant case progressed to the
Supreme Court.
C. The Supreme Court Rules on Tarrant
Justice Sotomayor delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court on June
13, 2013. 73 From the outset, the Court noted that TRWD was presenting
two alternative claims: (1) TRWD, as an agency of the State of Texas, “is
entitled to acquire water under the Compact from within Oklahoma and that
therefore the Compact pre-empts several Oklahoma statutes that restrict
out-of-state diversions,” and (2) Oklahoma’s water export laws violate the
Commerce Clause. 74 However, the Court proceeds first to give the
background of Red River disputes and discuss the way in which the
Compact broke down the basin into Reaches and Subbasins. 75
Notably, of the five subbasins in Reach II only one, number five, was
apportioned to the four signatory states with equal rights.76 Section
5.05(b)(1) allocates to each state 25% of the water in this subbasin in excess
of the water necessary to ensure the flow of the Red River at the ArkansasLouisiana border is 3000 cubic feet per second.77 Initially, the Respondents
argued that Arkansas and Louisiana were indispensable parties to the
litigation—both by threat of inconsistent litigation and possible effects on
the salinity of the Red River should TRWD divert water from the tributaries
in question; recall however, that this was dismissed by the district court.78
While this section was purported by TRWD to indicate its right to enter
Oklahoma to divert water, the Compact also provided that it should not be
interpreted to interfere with the rights of the Signatory States to regulate the
water within their boundaries.79 Even still, Petitioner argued that the
73. Tarrant VI, 133 S. Ct. 2120 (2013).
74. Id. at 2125.
75. Id. at 2125-28.
76. Id. at 2127.
77. Id. at 2126-27.
78. Tarrant I, NO. CIV-07-0045-HE, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79973, at *12-3 (W.D.
Okla. Oct. 29, 2007), rev’d sub nom. Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Sevenoaks, 545 F.3d 906
(10th Cir. 2008).
79. Tarrant VI, 133 S. Ct. at 2127-28 (quoting section 2.10 of the Compact). The Court
adds, “Rather, ‘[s]ubject to the general constraints of water availability and the
apportionment of the Compact, each state [remains] free to continue its existing internal
water administration.’” Id. It is unclear whether there was any argument over the use of the
word “existing” in this context given the changes that have taken place both in terms of
population and legislation. Certainly the Court did not see fit to mention it if there was.
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Compact’s silence on state boundary lines in section 5.05(b)(1) indicates
the intention to create a common pool. 80
The Court believed resolving this silence was the key to determining if
Oklahoma water statutes were pre-empted by the Compact. 81 Ultimately,
the Court decided the Compact did not create cross-border rights on three
bases: “[1] the well-established principle that States do not easily cede their
sovereign powers, including their control over waters within their own
territories; [2] the fact that other interstate water compacts have treated
cross-border rights explicitly; and [3] the parties’ course of dealings.” 82
First, TRWD argued that because even signatory states to the Compact
would necessarily need to be permitted by the OWRB to access this water,
the sovereignty of Oklahoma over its water resources is not being
challenged; however, this argument failed under a “have-your-cake-andeat-it-too” standard. 83 Second, the petitioner was unable to persuade the
Court that the custom of spelling-out cross-border rights in interstate
compacts is not substantially exhaustive. 84 However, TRWD did make the
interesting point that since the ratification of the Compact the southern
border between Oklahoma and Texas has changed from the “south bank” to
the “southern vegetation line.” This change could conceivably be seen as
creating a retroactive cross-border right, although not to the extent required
by the Court to interpret Section 5.05(b)(1).85 Finally, the Court cited
Alabama v. North Carolina 86 to indicate that “course of performance under
the Compact is highly significant evidence of its understanding of the
compact’s terms.” 87 Not only has no state attempted to utilize cross-border
rights for the purposes of water diversion since the Compact was approved
by Congress, but also TRWD itself previously attempted to purchase the
water it is currently suing to appropriate as a matter of right.88
The Court dispels with petitioner’s Commerce Clause argument rather
handily. Essentially, TRWD argued that if the water in controversy within
Subbasin 5 belongs entirely to Oklahoma and a substantial portion of that
water is not allocated to any signatory state, then that water is available to
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 2129-30.
Id. at 2130.
Id. at 2132.
Id. at 2133.
Id. at 2133-35.
Id. at 2134-35.
130 S. Ct. 2295, 2299 (2010).
Tarrant VI, 133 S. Ct. at 2135 (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
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TRWD following approval by the OWRB.89 However, because Oklahoma
water laws prevent this “unallocated water” from diversion out-of-state to
applicants such as TRWD, those laws violate the Commerce Clause by
impairing interstate commerce.90 Instead of addressing this argument the
Court declares that the water located in Oklahoma, in excess of Oklahoma’s
25% share, remains “allocated to Oklahoma unless and until another State
call for an accounting and Oklahoma is asked to refrain from utilizing more
than its entitled share. The Oklahoma water statutes cannot discriminate
against interstate commerce with respect to unallocated waters because the
Compact leaves no waters unallocated.”91 In a footnote, the Court further
explains that even if Oklahoma utilized less than its 25% share and allowed
the remainder to flow out of the state, under the terms of the Compact it
would pass from Reach II to Reach V and be fully allocated to Louisiana.92
This holding seems to miss the point of petitioner’s argument, forego
entirely any attempt to conflate section 5.05(b)(1)’s language with the
geographical realities, and decline to offer any valuable guidance as to the
construction of state protectionist statutes regarding valuable natural
resources. If it is true, as alleged in TRWD’s initial complaint 93, that the
excess “unallocated” water flowing out of Oklahoma through these
tributaries is wasted into the Gulf of Mexico, then this Court has bolstered
each State’s case for “hogging” natural resources and operating under the
entitlement bias.
Clearly TRWD’s argument for cross-border rights established by the
Compact was the weaker of the two; however, the stronger argument that
Oklahoma has enacted several statutes amounting to a public policy that
discourages or disallows export of Oklahoma water in violation of the
Commerce Clause received significantly shorter shrift from the courts.
D. Brief Analysis of the Supreme Court Ruling
In this instance, the Court focused on debunking arguments rather than
staring down the Commerce Clause elephant in the courtroom. Although
TRWD’s argument that the Red River Compact authorizes cross-border
entries and takings clearly stretched any reasonable understanding of state
sovereignty and could be easily disputed given their own course of dealings

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 2136.
Id. at 2137.
Id.
Id.
Amended Complaint, supra note 7, at 8.
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in attempting to purchase the water prior to filing suit, 94 the assertion that
Oklahoma statutes impede interstate commerce was and remains valid.
When addressing this argument, however, the Court focuses on TRWD’s
use of the term “unallocated water” in their dormant Commerce Clause
challenge and thereupon side-stepped the constitutional issue in favor of
denying that any water remains “unallocated” under the Compact.95
Therefore, because no water is “unallocated,” no water remains to be an
article of commerce. Without an article of commerce upon which to
challenge its regulatory scheme, any Commerce Clause argument
inherently fails.
The Court did little more than provide a spark notes version of a
narrowly tailored Red River Compact and suggest the Texas agency
demand an accounting of the water, essentially amounting to a “call on the
river.” 96 This suggests that any signatory state or state agency must appeal
to the Compact Commission under §2.11 of the Compact; however, this
does not address lack of the authority the Commission has over the
signatory states and ultimately amounts to a reconstruction of the Compact
to institute an actual governing body. Renegotiating the decades old, and
now possibly outdated, compact with the four signatory states and all
potentially affected Indian tribes seems an interestingly difficult idea from
the same Court which referred to accounting the total amount of water
within Oklahoma above its 25% allocation as a “herculean task.”97
However, Andrew points to the recent Truckee River Operating Agreement,
signed in 2008, between California, Nevada, the United States, and the
Palute Tribe of Nevada as “a possible blueprint for how to end a protracted
and multi-dimensional water-rights struggle.” 98 The two main reasons for
the success of the agreement are a voluntary exchange of stored water
coupled with an effective administration and dispute resolution system. 99
Moreover, the Court further muddied the waters (pun intended) on the
rights of reservoir-stricken Louisiana to waters of Reach II, Subbasin 5. It
effectively disallowed the equal proportionment of water agreed upon in
94. Brief for the Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, supra note 10, at 31.
95. Tarrant VI, 133 S. Ct. at 2136-37.
96. Id. at 2136.
97. Id. at 2134.
98. Andrew, supra note 61, at 202.
99. Id. at 200 (citing Barbara Cosens, Farmers, Fish, Tribal Power, and Poker;
Reallocating Water in the Truckee River Basin, Nevada and California, 14 HASTINGS W.N.W.J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1243, 1291-92 (2008)).
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the Compact itself, save what could be garnered from within the borders of
each signatory state. Whether by the fault of TRWD or by omission of the
Court, it appears that the petitioner’s desire to challenge the statutes
regardless of the actual, quantified “share” received by Texas was
overlooked. 100 The practical benefits of this opinion will rest only in
drafting interstate-compacts, water rights leases and purchase agreements
with Indian nations, and in affirming state sovereignty to borders and
natural resources.
Yet, these benefits were not foreign concepts in the jurisprudence leading
up to the Tarrant decision. At the district court level the Apache Tribe of
Oklahoma attempted to intervene as plaintiff based upon their documented
work with TRWD and their stated intent to continue that work until the
Tribe’s rights were quantified. However, the Apache Tribe was denied on
the basis of ripeness; 101 which seems somewhat inconsistent with the
criterion of “realistic fear or apprehension that the statute in question will
be enforced against them” espoused in Carr.102 Although not wholly unlike
the redressability standard as used in Hugo, “a party must show that a
favorable court judgment is likely to relieve the party’s injury.” 103 Recall
again, that the majority in Hugo relied on Wyoming Sawmills, supra, for the
proposition that Irving did not meet the redressability requirement for
standing whereas the dissent employed the same language from that case as
used against the Apache Tribe, “too speculative,” to distinguish Irving
claim and argue in favor of hearing the case on the merits.104
While not as “practical” as these Tarrant decisions could have been, the
judiciary successfully avoided conflating the final outcome of the entire
litigation process with the arguably premature suit to invalidate and enjoin
based on the lack of a signed water contract in the face of a comprehensive
water compact. 105 One of the major flaws with the approach attempted by
TRWD, Hugo, and Irving is that it did not wait for the state to take action
on its permit applications, nor did any party have a specifically prohibited
100. Tarrant V, 656 F.3d 1222, 1240 (10th Cir. 2011).
101. Tarrant I, No. CIV-07-0045-HE, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79973, at *9 (W.D. Okla.
Oct. 29, 2007), rev’d sub nom. Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Sevenoaks, 545 F.3d 906 (10th
Cir. 2008).
102. Altus v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828, 836 (D.W.D. Tex.), aff’d, 385 U.S. 35 (1966).
103. City of Hugo v. Nichols, 656 F.3d 1251, 1264 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing Coll v. First
Am. Title Ins. Co., 642 F.3d 876, 892 (10th Cir. 2011)).
104. Id.
105. Andrew encourages, and this author believes rightly so, that the next challengers of
Oklahoma water laws attempt a more aggressive or innovative option to force the court to
make a substantial analysis of the law itself. See Andrew, supra note 61, at 202.
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contract in place such that the court must necessarily review the public
policy behind the anti-export statutes. At all times throughout these ongoing
disputes, save possible foreshadowing in the dissent to Hugo by Justice
Matheson, the court was able to set aside the clear intent of the Oklahoma
legislature even when referencing the inherent public interest argument in
the dormant Commerce Clause. 106 It remains important to note that not all
efforts to resolve Tribal claims for federal reserved water rights have their
impetus in securing “wet water” rights for immediate use by the tribe.
Unless of course, the term use is deemed to include selling or leasing those
rights for the purposes of economic development. 107 It is hard to relate the
federal government’s support of tribal self-determination 108 with the ability
of state governments to define the uses to which the tribe can put their
quantified water rights. The court may feel the backlash of these procedural
side-steps when faced with redundant litigation aimed at determining tribal
rights and tribal water-export leases.
III. Case Law Before the Decision
The Supreme Court, in Sporhase v. Nebraska, held that water is an
article of commerce. 109 However, in the same case, the Court urged caution
in deciding the validity of state statutes regulating interstate commerce
because the un-invoked ability of Congress to regulate “does not foreclose
state regulation of its water resources, of the uses of water within the State,
or indeed, of interstate commerce in water.” 110 Factors weighing on the
Commerce Clause inquiry include states’ interests and competence in
“preserving scarce water resources,” claims of public ownership, and

106. Tarrant III, NO. CIV-07-0045-HE, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107520, at *22 (W.D.
Okla. Nov. 18, 2009).
107. Andrew, supra note 61, at 197. Andrew makes the interesting point that the
Choctaw Tribe, which joined the Chickasaw Tribe in their Amicus Brief in Support of
Respondents, is in the best position to sell water to users in Texas. “[H]owever, it seems that
the goal of the Choctaw is to keep as much of the water as it can for local uses, and it will
resist any transfers of its water to either Texas or central Oklahoma.” Id. (citing Bill Hanna,
Tarrant Water Officials Return to Federal Court in Oklahoma Water Fight, FORT WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM, Apr. 24, 2010, http://www.star-telegram.com/2010/04/24/2140337/tarrantwater-officials-return.html).
108. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334-35 (1983) (“[T]he
goal of promoting tribal self-government,” includes, “Congress’ overriding goal of
encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic development.”) (citations omitted).
109. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 953-54 (1982).
110. Id. at 954.
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“Congress’ deference to state water law.”111 Even so, in dormant
Commerce Clause cases the burden of proof rests on the state defending its
impermissible regulation to demonstrate that Congressional consent is
unmistakably clear or expressly stated. 112 The state bears the initial burden
to show a close fit between its statutory requirements and the asserted local
purpose of those requirements. 113
The Hughes test is then employed to determine if the local purpose is
legitimate and if that purpose could be achieved in a less discriminatory
way on interstate commerce. 114 Hughes involved a commercial minnow
farmer in Texas who ventured across state lines into Oklahoma to purchase
Oklahoma-grown minnows to take back across the border.115 The Court
struck down the Oklahoma law prohibiting such transport as impermissible
under the dormant Commerce Clause, overruled Geer v. Connecticut, 116 and
reversed the criminal courts below. 117 Justice Brennan, writing for the
majority, enumerated a simple three-step process to assess compliance:
(1) whether the challenged statute regulates evenhandedly with
only "incidental" effects on interstate commerce, or
discriminates against interstate commerce either on its face or in
practical effect; (2) whether the statute serves a legitimate local
purpose; and, if so, (3) whether alternative means could promote
this local purpose as well without discriminating against
interstate commerce. 118
“It is well settled that actions are within the domain of the Commerce
Clause if they burden interstate commerce or impede its free flow.” 119 It is
equally well settled that a state may not impose regulations on articles of
commerce that burden or discriminate against interstate commerce. 120
111. Id. at 953.
112. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 458 (1992); see also United Egg Producers v.
Dep’t of Agric. of P.R., 77 F.3d 567, 570 (1st Cir. 1996).
113. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979); see also Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 957.
114. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336.
115. Id. at 324.
116. 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
117. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 324-25.
118. Id. at 336.
119. C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 389 (1994) (citing NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31 (1937)).
120. City of Altus v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828, 837 (D.W.D. Tex. 1966) (relying on H.P.
Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S.
352 (1913)).
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In West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., the State of Oklahoma argued its
authority to conserve, essentially to reserve, the “resources of the state for
the use of [its] inhabitants” to the extent that it effectively denied
individuals the right to transport natural gas across state boundaries. 121 The
Supreme Court struck down the offending statute under an entitlement bias
analysis, that reasoned, produced gas becomes a commodity, regulated as
an article of commerce, yet conserved for the business welfare of the state
such that the only outcome of the policy, if widespread, would be the
hoarding of natural resources by the producing state.122 Both West and Carr
are distinguished from the present case because Tarrant deals with water
apportioned to the states, not individuals as personal property, subject to a
comprehensive water compact.
Moreover, both cases more egregiously violated the Commerce Clause
by denying transportation rights across state lines rather than enacting
protectionist measures and denying the assertion of cross-border rights as in
Tarrant. Humorously, TRWD argued for an injunction preventing the
denial of its applications, which would result in the loss of priority as
responsive applications for appropriation were likely, and relied on the
likelihood that Oklahoma would amend its laws in response to the
application—precisely what the State of Texas did nearly forty-two years
earlier which led to the Carr decision.123 Although Carr was decided
mostly on procedural grounds—a window into the future some forty
years—it definitively held in regard to a defense of prematurity, that if a
state official may enforce a statute equally by declining to act as by taking
some affirmative action that there is threat enough to bring suit.124 Although
this did not receive any mention in the Tarrant decisions, the premise
stands in contrast to the language in Hugo, supra, implying that the city
ought to have waited for the OWRB to act before bringing suit. 125 Looking
further down the road, it will be interesting to see if that same sentiment
will affect Tribal negotiations with the State of Oklahoma regarding water
rights now that several tribes have expressed interest in selling water outof-state.
Also of note, is the reluctance of the courts to discuss the Reynolds case,
mentioned by the parties but never dealt with outright, in which El Paso,
Texas, challenged a New Mexico law purporting to ban any export of
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

221 U.S. 229, 250 (1910).
Id. at 255.
Carr, 255 F. Supp. at 832; see also Amended Complaint, supra note 7, at 6.
Carr, 255 F. Supp. at 836.
City of Hugo v. Nichols, 656 F.3d 1251, 1253-54 (10th Cir. 2011).
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groundwater from New Mexico. 126 The court, in Reynolds, relied on the
language of Sporhase, supra, in specifically deciding against upholding
discriminatory state statutes that could not both protect a legitimate public
interest and maintain only incidental effects on interstate commerce. 127
IV. The Tribal Nations’ Role in the Tarrant Decisions
Tarrant identified early on in this proceeding that it was both willing and
able to purchase the water from public and private parties within
Oklahoma. 128 The amici curiae brief filed jointly by the Chickasaw and
Choctaw Tribes of Oklahoma cites this interest—negotiating purchase
rather than appropriation—as an admission by TRWD that it does not have
any rights to appropriate water from within the borders of another state. 129
However, it would appear that Tarrant proceeded upon two alternative
grounds: one being the right to appropriate existed under the Compact,
which preempted Oklahoma state law, or the second that the state laws
preventing the successful negotiations to purchase were unconstitutional.
The Winters Doctrine guarantees the reserved water rights that are inherent
in each reservation; as such these rights are a product of federal law and
outside the scope of state legislation. 130 The waterways on a reservation are
considered an integral part of the land given to the Nation, such that the
streams belong to the Tribe as if they were part of the land, and upon
realization the priority will date back to the establishment of the reservation
without the risk of being loss due to non-use. 131
In evaluating the very likely possibility of out-of-state sale by Indian
tribes, Andrew, supra, discusses two possible arguments Oklahoma could
make to impair their ability to do so.132 First, the state could assert
“conditional prohibition” requiring the out-of-state buyer to seek legislative
approval from the state, instead of the in-state seller. 133 Second, the state
could allege that the tribes were selling the water off-reservation on account
of the distance of pipeline that would need to be constructed. 134 However,
126. City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. 379 (D.N.M. 1983).
127. Id. at 388.
128. Amended Complaint, supra note 7, at 19.
129. Brief for the Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, supra note 10, at 10.
130. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908).
131. Id. at 576-77.
132. Andrew, supra note 61, at 195-96.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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as noted, both arguments would most likely fail; the first due to the Indian
Commerce Clause 135 and the second because not only would the water
district most likely be responsible for partial pipeline construction, as
indicated by the previous dealings between TRWD and the Tribes, but also
because modern precedent leans toward allowing off-site sale of articles
produced on the reservation without interference from state law.136 The
Note is quick to point out, as an unresolved matter, that interstate compacts
function as federal law and have not yet been pitted against tribal commerce
rights. 137
Denied by the Western District of Oklahoma District Court for ripeness,
the Apache Tribe of Oklahoma initially attempted to intervene as plaintiff
alongside Tarrant. The Apache Tribe argued that because the tribe had
reserved water rights and had entered into a memorandum of understanding
together to further the goal of quantifying those rights for future sale to
TRWD, the Tribe could claim a prospective injury on the count that
pursuant to the 2002 moratorium the OWRB would almost assuredly inhibit
the export of tribal water. Judge Heaton called that scenario “too
speculative and subject to too many contingencies” such that any decision
by the court would be “tantamount to an advisory opinion.”138
Interestingly, the Chickasaw and Choctaw Tribes of Oklahoma wrote an
amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court in favor of the respondents,
OWRB. 139 However, this brief seems to concur with the state’s argument
that TRWD does not have rights to appropriate or take water from within
Oklahoma’s boundaries, but instead must purchase that water. Notably, the
Tribes hint that once their own reserved water rights are quantified, they
may be able to resolve TRWD’s claim. 140 Currently the water rights of the
two Nations are being litigated in two cases: Chickasaw Nation v. Fallin,
No. 5:11-CV-00927 (W.D. Okla. filed Aug. 18, 2011); Okla. Water Res.
Bd. v. United States, No. 5:12-CV-00275-W (W.D. Okla. filed Mar. 12,
2012). Both bases are currently stayed pending the results of mediation.

135. Id. (citing Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685, 69091 (1965)).
136. Id. (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980);
California v. McCovey, 685 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1984)).
137. Id.
138. Tarrant IV, NO. CIV-07-0045-HE, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72442, at *11, *11 n.11
(W.D. Okla., July 16, 2010).
139. Brief for the Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, supra note 10, at 8.
140. Id. at 43-44.
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TRWD argued in its amended complaint: “[s]urface and groundwater
owned by sovereign tribal entities secured by treaty or reservation with the
United States is not subject to, and is excluded from governance under, the
Red River Compact, as provided in Article II, Section 2.07.” 141 This section
of the Compact protects water rights based on federal law, such as tribal
reserved rights, stating, “[n]othing in this Compact shall be deemed to
impair or affect the powers, rights, or obligations of the United States, or
those claiming under its authority, in, over and to water of the Red River
Basin.” 142 It seems as though all interested parties would be forced to agree
with this understanding of the compact; however, given that Oklahoma has
enacted statutes specifically curtailing tribal compacts any actual export by
tribal nations may still be fought by the state.
V. Conclusion
The granting of certiorari in the Tarrant case caused excitement among
the water law legal community; although, in its effect the ultimate holding
fell far short of its anticipated grandeur. Yet, the blame does not lie with the
Court, or the State of Oklahoma, or even with the thirsty State of Texas and
its water districts. The Court, on the full weight of precedent, acted as a
champion of state sovereignty to borders and natural resources in
constructing a precedent of very limited application. The Oklahoma statutes
alleged to be unconstitutionally restrictive on interstate commerce cannot
be attacked from a posture of probabilities; such an attempt will inherently
fall on the swords of procedure and jurisprudence, as has been the case
from 2007 to present. Certain opinions—whether in dissent against the lessnarrowly-minded-majority or in early denials of motions for summary
judgment—indicate there may be rapids around the next bend of the water
appropriation river; however, until such time as direct action is taken by a
signatory state to put protectionist words into prohibited practice these
waters remain still. At present, the best course of action for the Red River
states is to amend the Compact or go outside it. As long as Tribal Nations
are engaged in lengthy general stream adjudication and the quantification of
their reserved water rights, it remains abundantly clear that they cannot be
counted on to deliver several hundred thousand acre-feet of water.
However, from the foregoing it is apparent that upon delivery of these
rights much will change.
141. Amended Complaint, supra note 7, at 7.
142. Brief for the Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, supra note 10, at 8.
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